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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial areas in the field of international
tradelaw is the use of domestic subsidies and the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties to offset their effects. Under the GATT' system,
there are two legitimate disciplines which deal with these issues. On
the one hand, there is a set of rules regarding the use of subsidies.
International disputes concerning these rules may be settled on a mul-
tilateral basis. On the other hand, there are rules that impose restric-
tions on an importing country's ability to take unilateral
countermeasures against imports of subsidized goods. The second set
of rules provides that an importing country is allowed to impose coun-
tervailing duties on imported products in order to offset the effects of a
subsidy only if the imports, through the effects of the subsidy, cause
material injury to the producers of the like product in the importing
country.
The imposition of countervailing duties has advantages for the im-
porting country over other forms of import protection. First, there is
no obligation to provide compensation or trade benefits to the export-
ing country. Second, since the threshold of injury to the domestic in-
dustry ("material injury") is lower than that for safeguard measures
under article XIX of GATT ("serious injury"), there are fewer barri-
ers for this type of protection. 2
1. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
arts. V & VI, T.I.A.S. No.1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. The use of countervailing duties may also have certain disadvantages. Most importantly,
the benefits of the subsidy to the consumers in the importing country may outweigh the harm to
the domestic producers. In such cases, the imposition of countervailing duties not only reduces
the benefit of the cheap imports for the consumers but may also cause a loss of welfare for the
importing country as a whole. For a discussion of the economics of subsidies, see Deardorff &
Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy. An Overview, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING
WORLD ECONOMY 15-68 (R. Stern ed. 1987); Dixit, How Should the United States Respond to
Other Countries' Trade Policies? in id. at 245-282; Brander, Rationales for Strategic Trade and
Industrial Policy, in STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
23-46 (P. Krugman ed. 1986); W. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE, Ch. 2
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Since it determines the scope of application of countervailing duty
law, the definition of a "countervailable subsidy" is critical to the
availability of this form of import protection. There are certain rules
concerning the minimum procedures for the imposition of such duties.
However, no detailed substantive definition of what constitutes a
countervailable or actionable subsidy is agreed upon, either nationally
or internationally.
Both international rules and U.S. law distinguish between subsidies
that are specifically linked to the export of a product ("export subsi-
dies") and those that are bestowed on the manufacture or production
of a good ("domestic subsidies"). In this article, I shall discuss the so-
called "specificity test," which is used to determine which types of
domestic subsidies are potentially countervailable under U.S. law.
Under this test, a benefit conferred by government on more than a
specific group of enterprises or industries within a community is not
considered a countervailable subsidy.
The definition of a countervailable subsidy based on a specificity
requirement has been criticized extensively. Opponents of such a test
have argued that a subsidy should be defined on the basis of the tom-
petitive advantage that the recipient of the government-provided bene-
fit obtains vis A vis producers of like products in the importing
country. According to this view, a countervailable subsidy should be
found where the exporting industry obtains a benefit that the injured
importing industry of the like products does not receive. This is the
case, according to this argument, regardless of whether producers of
other products in the exporting country receive similar benefits.
This article argues that this criticism is invalid, and that "specific-
ity" should, in fact, be required before a benefit can be considered a
countervailable subsidy. Subsequently, it explains the shades of the
specificity test under U.S. law, and how the agency which administers
countervailing duty law applies that test. Finally, this article discusses
whether, under U.S. law, it is sufficient to rely on this test or whether
additional requirements should be imposed before a benefit is deemed
a countervailable subsidy.
The specificity test has both an economic and a pragmatic ration-
ale. The economic rationale lies in the concept of competitive free
markets, where scarce resources are channelled to their most profita-
ble uses by the forces of supply and demand. A subsidy is a discrimi-
natory practice in favor of one or more market participants giving its
(1974); INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY (S. Warnecke ed. 1978); Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989).
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recipients have obtained an exclusive advantage vis A vis the other par-
ticipants in such markets. Subsidies distort the free market process by
enabling the recipients of the benefits to obtain scarce resources which
other market participants could have used more profitably. Therefore,
they are generally considered to be inefficient.
3
Measures that do not discriminate between market participants,
alternatively, do not create such distortions. Suppose, for example,
that the central bank of country A raises taxes or prints extra money
and gives all the citizens of that country $1,000. Because all market
participants receive the same treatment, the grant will not change the
competitive position of its beneficiaries to obtain scarce resources. The
same point can be made where a government provides goods (e.g., pe-
troleum) or services to all domestic users at prices below world market
rates. Since the concept of subsidy presumes discrimination among
market participants, measures that affect all sectors of an economy
equally cannot be considered to confer countervailable subsidies.
4
However, there is no sort of governmental action or intervention so
broad as to affect all market participants equally. Capital intensive
enterprises, for example, benefit disproportionately from a system of
taxation that allows accelerated depreciation of assets. Likewise, high-
technology enterprises benefit more from a well-developed educational
system than the agricultural sector does. Hence, the specificity test
does not require that an equal benefit be obtained by all market par-
ticipants or that intervention be completely neutral in its effects in or-
der to avoid countervailing duties. As long as programs benefit more
than specific enterprises or industries, they will not cause significant
economic distortions, and will be held consequently not
countervailable.
In addition to recognizing the fact that the effects of general pro-
grams are offset by other macroeconomic factors, the specificity test
has a practical purpose. All governments adopt programs and take
measures that affect certain enterprises or industries more than others.
Such government actions and regulations affect nearly all goods in in-
3. See, e.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,370-71 (1984)
(final determination) (unless otherwise noted, all Commerce decisions cited hereinafter are final
determinations), and Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
4. See Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the
Agency's Record at 29-30, Cabot Corp. v. United States, Consolidated Court No. 86-09-01109
(Ct. Int'l Trade, filed Sept. 8, 1986) ("Cabot Memorandum") partially reprinted in Hunter &
Kuhbach, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties: Highlights Since 1984, in THE COMMERCE DE-
PARTMENT SPEAKS 491, 538-540 (PLI 1987). Likewise, the effects of such general measures on
international trade are mitigated or counterbalanced by other macro-economic factors such as
higher levels of taxation and inflation, or a devaluation of the country's currency. See also Com-
mission of the European Communities, Dec., O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L106) 233 (1985).
[Vol. 10:807
The Specificity Test
ternational trade. If the benefits of all these programs were
countervailable, then, in theory, countervailing duties could be im-
posed on nearly all imports which caused injury to producers of like
products in the importing country. This would mean not only that the
countervailing duty law would be virtually impossible to administer,
but countervailing duty law would also tend to replace the import pro-
tection that can be given by ordinary safeguard measures. There would
be substantial potential for political problems between the United
States and the affected exporting countries. The specificity test offers a
reasonably objective standard for deciding which types of domestic
government practices are potentially countervailable. The test there-
fore helps to increase predictability in the application of the counter-
vailing duty law, and to reduce the potential number of trade disputes.
II. BACKGROUND
The first countervailing duty statute of general applicability was
the Tariff Act of 1897. 5 The language of this Act evolved out of two
earlier countervailing duty provisions that had been applicable only to
sugar imports.6 Congress periodically reenacted the 1897 law, which
was limited to export subsidies. 7 The only substantive amendment to
its concept of a countervailable benefit (a "bounty or grant") was the
inclusion of domestic subsidies in 1922.8 Like its predecessors, the
current version of this statute, section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930,9
does not generally require a determination regarding the effects of a
subsidy before countervailing duties can be imposed. Current U.S. law
5. 30 Stat. 151, 205.
6. These first U.S. countervailing duty provisions were Tariff Act § 237, sched. E, 26 Stat.
567, 584 (1890) and Tariff Act, para. 182, 28 Stat. 521 (1894).
7. Tariff Act § 6, 36 Stat. 85 (1909); Tariff Act, para. E, 38 Stat. 193 (1913); Tariff Act, ch.
356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935 (1922); Tariff Act § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (1930); Trade Act § 331(a), 88 Stat.
2049, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1974).
8. Tariff Act, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935 (1922).
9. Section 303(a)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the "1930 Act"), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1982) provides:
Levy of Countervailing Duties
(1) [Wlhenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of
government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow,
directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of
any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony,
province, or other political subdivision of government, then upon the importation of such
article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly
from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is
imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has
been changed in condition by remanufacture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in
all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed.
Unless otherwise noted, sections cited hereinafter will refer to the 1930 Act, as amended.
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provides that the determination whether a subsidy exists, and the cal-
culation of its amount, falls under the authority of the International
Trade Administration (the "ITA") of the Department of Commerce
("Commerce").' 0
In 1947, the GATT was established. Article VI of the.GATT re-
quires that, before countervailing duties may be imposed, it must be
determined not only that imports are subsidized but also that the sub-
sidized imports cause or threaten material injury to the producers of
the like product in the importing country (or materially retarded the
establishment of such an industry). "t However, the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application, through which the GATT is still applied, exempts
pre-existing legislation from compliance with, inter alia, article VI.
Since section 303 antedated the GATT, the absence of an injury re-
quirement under U.S. countervailing duty law did not constitute a vio-
lation of the GATT.
The Trade Act of 1974 (the "1974 Act") included non-dutiable
merchandise within the scope of the countervailing duty law. Since
this inclusion could not benefit from the grandfather rights of the Pro-
tocol of Provisional Application, the 1974 Act requires an injury de-
termination by the International Trade Commission ("ITC") before
countervailing duties may be imposed on non-dutiable products. The
1974 Act specifies that such a determination is only applicable, how-
ever, when it is required by "the international obligations of the
United States" to the exporting country or countries involved.'
2
The countervailing duty law was substantially amended by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("1979 Act"). These amendments
were intended, in particular, to implement the Agreement on Interpre-
tation and Application of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' 3 ("Subsidies Code"), which was con-
10. Commerce became the administering authority in 1979. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 2(a); 3 C.F.R. 131 (1981), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979), reprinted in 19 U.S.C.A. § 2171
(1982). Until 1979, the countervailing duty law was administered by the Treasury Department.
11. GATTsupra note 1, art. VI, para. 6(a).
12. Section 303(a)(2) of the 1930 act, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982). The most important
obligations in this respect are, of course, the obligations under the GATT to the other signato-
ries.
Reflecting Congress' increasing concern for U.S. manufacturers and the greater need for im-
port relief when lowering tariff protection, the 1974 Act also imposed specific time limits upon
the determination by the Treasury Department of the existence of a "bounty or grant" (19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a)(4) (1982)), granted American producers the right to judicial review of negative deter-
minations (19 U.S.C. § 1516(a) (1982)) and empowered the Treasury Department with a condi-
tional right to waive the imposition of countervailing duties in order to facilitate the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. (19 U.S.C, § 1303(d)(2) (1982)). See, e.g., ASG In-
dustries v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 777 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
13. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted
[Vol. 10:807
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cluded during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
The most important amendment to the 1930 Act was the introduction
of a new section 701,14 which requires an injury determination before
countervailing duties may be imposed on goods originating in a "coun-
try under the Agreement."' 15 Section 303 remained applicable to mer-
chandise originating in other countries outside the GATT.
Hence, before countervailing duties may be imposed on imported
products, Commerce should determine that a more than de minimis
16
in GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 56-83 (1980); see generally, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Report by the Director-General 53-61 (GATT/1979-3), Geneva, Apr. 1979; Rivers
& Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Bridging
Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1477 (1979); Tarullo, The MTN
Subsidies Code. Agreement without Consensus, in EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 63-99 (S. Rubin & G. Hufbauer eds. 1984).
14. Section 701(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982) provides:
General Rule. -If-
(1) the administering authority determines that
(A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or its corporation, associ-
ation, or other organization organized in such a country, is providing, directly or
indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or exportation
of a class or kind of merchandise imported into the United States, and
(2) The Commission determines that...
(A) an industry in the United States...
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by
reason of imports of that merchandise, then there shall be imposed upon such mer-
chandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the
amount of the net subsidy.
15. Section 701(b), as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982), defines the term "country under the Agreement" as a country whose
government has: (I) signed the Subsidies Code, id. at (b)(l) (GATT Doc. No. L/5808) (as of
April 1988, Australia (with reservation), Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, member states of the
European Economic Community, Egypt, Finland, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia (with reserva-
tion), Israel (with reservation), Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines (with
reservation), Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia); (2) concluded
an agreement with the U.S. that includes obligations substantially equivalent to those under the
Subsidies Code, id. at (b)(2) (currently Taiwan is the only such country, 45 Fed. Reg. 1181
(1980)); or (3) been determined by the President to meet the requirements of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(b)(3) through other means (i.e., El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Nepal, North Yemen,
Paraguay, and Venezuela; see President's Memorandum of Dec. 14, 1979, Transmitting Determi-
nation Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 44 Fed. Reg. 74, 81 (1979); S. REP. No.
249., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 381, 431;
H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1979). The Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), § 1314 permits the U.S. Trade
Representative ("USTR") to revoke the injury test for any country that violates a Subsidies Code
commitment it has undertaken with respect to the United States and § 1336 requires a review by
the USTR of Subsidies Code commitments undertaken by other countries with respect to the
United States. Section 1618 of 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reintroduced as H.R.3, the "Trade and
International Economic Policy Reform Act", see infra, note 74, would have retroactively applied
the injury test to imports from countries which assumed Subsidies Code or equivalent obligations
after the imposition of a countervailing duty or during pending investigations but was dropped
by the conferees.
16. Commerce has determined that it disregards any net subsidy which is less than 0.5% ad
valorem or the equivalent specific rate. 19 C.F.R. § 355.8 (1988).
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countervailable benefit has been bestowed on the manufacture, pro-
duction or exportation of a product, and the ITC should determine
that the U.S. producers of the like product have been, or are
threatened to be, injured by the subsidized imports. Such ITC deter-
minations are limited to cases involving non-dutiable products where
such a determination is required by the international obligations of the
United States, or dutiable products originating in a country under the
Agreement. 7
III. STATUS OF SPECIFICITY UNDER U.S. LAW
A. The Statute
Both sections 303 and 701 of the 1930 Act provide that, once the
existence of an injurious benefit has been determined, a countervailing
duty should be imposed. In addition to this imperative language, the
statutory conferral of an injury investigation to the ITC may constrain
Commerce in the factors which it can take into account in its subsidy
determination. Since the specificity test restricts the types of govern-
ment benefits that would qualify as potentially countervailable subsi-
dies, the question arises whether U.S. law grants any discretion to
Commerce to formulate its own tests and definitions to interpret the
statute. Specifically, can Commerce exclude certain types of govern-
ment intervention from the statutory concepts of a "bounty or grant"
and of "subsidy"?
1) Section 303(a) of the 1930 Act
a) General
Section 303(a)(1), applicable only to goods originating in countries
that are not "countries under the Agreement," merely refers to
countervailable benefits as a "bounty or grant." What constitutes such
"a bounty or grant," however, is unclear.
In 1919, before domestic subsidies were included in the law, the
Supreme Court held:
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has not. A
word of broader significance than "grant" could not have been used.
Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow," it expresses a concession, the
conferring of something by one person upon another. And if the "some-
thing" is conferred by a country "upon the exportation of any article or
merchandise" a countervailing duty is required. . . .18
17. In light of these international obligations, the analysis hereinafter assumes that an injury
determination is required in all cases.
18. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919); see also Downs v. United States,
187 U.S. 496 (1903).
[Vol. 10:807
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This suggested that the terms "bounty" and "grant" should be defined
broadly. In 1971, however, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
provided:
In the assessment of a countervailing duty, the determination that a
bounty or grant is paid necessarily involves judgments in the political,
legislative, or policy spheres .... There can be no doubt that the Secre-
tary is under a legal duty to assess countervailing duties if he sees a
bounty or grant being paid, but we think he does and must exercise some
discretion in defining what acts of foreign governments confer bounties
or grants, when the case is doubtful. 19
Likewise, in 1977, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, ac-
knowledged that:
Congress' intent to provide a wide latitude, within which the Secretary
of Treasury ...may determine the existence or non-existence of a
bounty or a grant, is clear from the statute itself, and from the congres-
sional refusal to define the words "bounty" or "grant," or "net amount,"
in the statute or anywhere else, for almost 80 years.
20
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that the case involved a gituation
where the economic effects and fairness of a practice were controver-
sial. Because there was "a lack of agreement on what constitutes a
fair, as opposed to an "unfair" subsidy.., it [was] not the task of the
judiciary to substitute its views as to fairness and economic effect for
those of the Secretary."'2' Since the Treasury Department's interpreta-
tion of the statute (and thus of a countervailable benefit) was reason-
able, the Court upheld its determination. Although the case involved
export subsidies, this analysis is equally applicable to domestic
subsidies.
In addition to its discretion in determining the existence of a
"bounty or grant," the administering authority also had some discre-
tion in calculating the amount of the countervailing duty. In ASG In-
dustries v. United States,22 the court of Customs and Patent Appeals
held that, although the Treasury Department in principle lacks discre-
tion to refuse to impose a countervailing duty once it has been deter-
mined that a bounty or grant is being paid or bestowed, the provision
19. United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., 440 F.2d 1024, 1030-1031 (1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971). In United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1217 (C.C.P.A.
1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 443 (1978) the court added judgments in "the eminently important eco-
nomic sphere."
20. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d at 1216. The Court distinguished a more
restrictive early case, Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903), but declined to do the same
with Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919). Nevertheless, in light of the narrower
definition of "bounty or grant" in Zenith, Nicholas seems to be of less value now. But see ASG
Indus. Inc. v. United States, 467 F.Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
21. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. at 459 (quoting S. REP. No. 1298, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974)).
22. 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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that "there shall be levied ... a duty equal to the net amount of such
bounty or grant" 23 implies that "certain deductions may be made from
the actual payments to calculate the net bounty or grant and that all
relevant circumstances are to be taken into account."'24 ASG Indus-
tries involved benefits under a regional development program. The
court provided that if (and only if) the alleged disadvantages in the
region could be proven, they would be deducted from the net amount
of the bounty or grant.
b) The Specificity Test under Section 303(a)
The status of a specificity test prior to the enactment of the 1979
Act is unclear. 25 In Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States,
26
Commerce argued that the Treasury Department, in the last years of
its tenure over the administration of the countervailing duty law, in
fact applied the rule that a generally available subsidy was not
countervailable under section 303. The court, while upholding Com-
merce's application of the specificity test, rejected this argument. It
held that although no generally available domestic subsidy had ever
been countervailed, this was the result of a lack of opportunity to ad-
dress the question, rather than a long-standing and consistent adminis-
trative practice. 27 In a subsequent case, Commerce gave specific
examples of benefits that were alleged not to be countervailed because
of their general availability. 28 The court, however, rejected these de-
terminations as precedents and pointed to another benefit which it
considered to be generally available, but which the Treasury Depart-
ment had deemed countervailable. Consequently, it held that "these
determinations, individually or jointly did not convey a coherent rule
regarding 'general availability' " and rejected the specificity test.29
Whether or not a specificity test was applied before the enactment
of the 1979 Act, one should realize that such a test may not have been
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
24. ASG Industries v. United States, 610 F.2d 770, 777 (1979). But see infra notes 34-5 and
accompanying text.
25. This is partly due to the fact that determinations which failed to find a countervailable
subsidy were not published until 1975 (Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331, 88 Stat.
1978, 2050 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1-6) (1982)), and that it was not before
the 1979 Act that reasons had to be given in countervailing duty determinations (1979 act, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 160 (1979) (adding § 705(d) to the 1930 act) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d) (1982)).
26. 564 F.Supp. 834, 837 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
27. 564 F.Supp. at 837.
28. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F.Supp. 1237, 1244 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
29. 590 F.Supp. at 1244.
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necessary (to avoid countervailing certain types of domestic subsidies).
Until 1974, the Treasury Department was able to use its administra-
tive discretion to reject countervailing duty petitions where a subsidy
had no trade effects.
30
2) Section 701 of the 1930 Act
a) General
For products originating in "countries under the Agreement," sec-
tion 701 applies. In addition to Commerce's subsidy determination,
section 701 requires an injury determination by the ITC. As was the
case with the pre-1979 legislation, 31 the amendments made by the
1979 Act were based on a concept of "unfair" subsidies, rather than
holding countervailable all benefits conferred upon the production of
imported products.
32
While section 303 refers to potentially countervailable benefits as a
"bounty or grant", section 701 calls such benefits a "subsidy." The
1979 Act also added section 771(5). Although this section does not
define what constitutes such a subsidy, it does give several examples. 33
The 1979 Act also explicitly limited the deductions allowed in de-
termining the "net subsidy" to those listed in section 771(6).3 4 The
30. Horlick, Current Issues in Countervailing Duty Law, in THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT
OF 1979 - FOUR YEARS LATER 7, 20-26 (PLI 1983); G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE PRACTICES 297 (1979).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 437 U.S. 443, 455 (1978).
32. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Report]; and
125 CONG. REC. 20,167, 20,171 (1979); see also H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Report].
33. Section 771(5) of the 1930 Act, as amended by § 101 of the 1979 Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5) (1982) provides:
Subsidy. The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as
that term is used in section 303 of this title, and includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to illustra-
tive list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action
to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether pub-
licly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the
manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained
by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
34. Section 771(6), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(6) (1982) provides:
Net subsidy. - For the purpose of determining the net subsidy, the administering au-
thority may subtract from the gross subsidy the amount of -
(A) any application fee, deposit, or similar payment paid in order to qualify for, or
to receive, the benefit of the subsidy,
Summer 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
legislative history makes clear that this list is exhaustive and that
Commerce is no longer allowed to deduct certain expenses from the
aggregate amount of the subsidy. For example, the deduction offset-
ting regional disadvantages in the case of regional development pro-
grams from the aggregate amount of the subsidy found was no longer
permitted. 35 In light of these new and more specific provisions, it
should be determined whether Commerce retains any discretion in de-
fining a potentially countervailable benefit.
In a recent case, decided under section 303, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit followed Zenith and interpreted the term "net
amount of the benefit" as giving the administering authority "broad
discretion in determining the existence of a bounty or grant under that
law."' 36 Since section 771(5) provides that the term "subsidy" has the
same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" and Congress intended
to have "a complete harmony and continuity" 37 between determina-
tions under sections 303(a) and 701, Commerce must have the same
discretion with respect to the definition of a subsidy under section
771(5).
3 8
b) The Specificity Test under Section 771(5)
Even though the examples of subsidies in sections 771(5)(A) and
(B) are not exhaustive, Commerce has interpreted the clause "if pro-
vided... to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries" in section 771 (5)(B) as a statutory expression of a specific-
ity requirement for domestic subsidies:
We view the word "specific" in the statutory definition [of a domestic
subsidy] as necessarily modifying both "enterprise and industry" and
"group of enterprises or industries." If Congress had intended programs
of general applicability to be countervailable, this language would be su-
(B) any loss in the value of the subsidy resulting from its deferred receipt, if the
deferral is mandated by Government order, and
(C) export taxes, duties, or other charges levied on the export of merchandise to the
United States specifically intended to offset the subsidy received.
35. 1979 House Report, supra note 32, at 74-75 and 1979 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 85-
86.
36. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also
Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 664 F.Supp. 1444, 1448 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
37. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 84.
38. If Sections 303 and 771(5) are "legally interchangeable" (Can Am Corp. v. United States,
664 F.Supp. at 1448), it could be asked why Congress, in enacting the 1979 Act, did not repeal
Section 303(a) and, instead, created one provision on subsidies applicable to products originating
in both "countries under the Agreement" and other countries. The answer to this probably lies
in the fact that the GATT required an injury test for all GATT signatories, whether they were
countries under the Agreement or not. As stated above, since the U.S. countervailing duty laws
antedated the GATT, it benefitted from grandfather rights. Congress might have preferred not
to deal with the old statute at all in order to avoid problems concerning those grandfather rights.
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perfluous and different language easily could and would have been
used.
3 9
Commerce has argued further that this conclusion is supported by
"the clear Congressional intent that 'subsidy' be given the same mean-
ing as 'bounty or grant' under section 303 of the Act" 4 and the fact
that Congress endorsed the policy of the Treasury Department not to
countervail generally available programs.
4 1
B. The Courts and Specificity
1) Scope of Review
The statutory standards of review in countervailing duty determi-
nations allow the courts to reverse only those final Commerce determi-
nations that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law" 42 or, in the case of review of
determinations on the agency's record, those that are "unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."'4 3 "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 44 Furthermore, the court must give substantial weight to
the statutory interpretation of the agency administering the counter-
vailing duty law4 5 and "tremendous deference" to the findings of the
agency charged with making determinations under the statute.
46
2) Case Law
The decisions of the Court of International Trade (the "CIT") on
the specificity test have been unclear and sometimes inconsistent.
47
The most controversial case, Cabot Corp. v. United States added even
39. Certain Steel Products From Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,329 app. 4 (1982).
40. 47 Fed. Reg. at 39,304.
41. Id. But see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1982)
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982).
44. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1985) (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)), as cited in Alberta Pork Produ-
cers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.Supp. 445, 449 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
45. American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Georgetown
Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd.
v. United States, 669 F.Supp. 445, 449 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
46. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 622 F.Supp. 1071, 1075 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.Supp. 445, 449 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987).
47. See, e.g., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983), Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F.Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) and
Agrexco, Agric. Export Co. Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 1238 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
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more confusion. 48 In the case which gave rise to Cabot, Commerce
had applied the specificity test in the context of natural resources.
4 9
Petroleos Mexicanos, the government owned petroleum company of
Mexico, provided carbon black feedstock (CBFS), a petroleum deriva-
tive, and natural gas to Mexican users at rates well below their world
market export prices. Both products were available at the same prices
to all industrial users within Mexico but, besides the carbon black in-
dustry, there were no other users of CBFS. Commerce determined
that the fact that only the carbon black industry used CBFS was due
to "the inherent nature of the product and the current levels of tech-
nology" in Mexico.50 Since the limitations on use were not due to
activities of the Mexican government, Commerce held that the benefits
were not limited to a specific group of enterprises or industries.5 '
The court rejected the specificity test as applied by Commerce and
distinguished between "generalized benefits" which accrue generally
to all citizens (such as national defense, education, or infrastructure)
and benefits that may be generally available but nevertheless dispro-
portionately benefit specific recipients. It further stated:
The appropriate standard focuses on the de facto case by case effect
of benefits provided to recipients rather than on the nominal availability
of benefits .... The definition of "bounty or grant" under section 1303
as intended by Congress remains as it is embodied in the case law and
later affirmed by Congress in section 1677(5). This definition requires
focusing only on whether a benefit or "competitive advantage" has been
actually conferred on a "specific enterprise or industry, or group of en-
terprises or industries." In the case before the Court, the availability of
carbon black feedstock and natural gas at controlled prices does not de-
termine whether the benefits actually received by these carbon black pro-
ducers are countervailable subsidies. The programs appear to effect
48. 620 F.Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
49. Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983); see also, Anhydrous and Aqua
Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,522 (1983); Portland Hydraulic Cement and Cement
Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (1983).
50. Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,568 (1983). This "inherent nature"
test was first pronounced in Certain Softwood Products From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159,
24,167 (1983) as an additional reason to determine that the benefits of cheap lumber rights were
not countervailable. That determination was really based on the finding that the benefit of the
cheap lumber accrued defacto to more than a specific group of enterprises or industries. See also
infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
51. Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,568 (1983). By giving this explana-
tion for its determination, Commerce mixed up issues. Rather than holding that there was no
specificity, Commerce should have said that although the low priced CBFS was defacto provided
only to a specific industry, CBFS was not provided to carbon black producers at a preferential
price because comparable petroleum derivatives that served as a benchmark for determining
whether it was provided on a preferential basis were provided at substantially equivalent prices to
other industries. Although this point was mentioned in the 1983 determination, it was only given
its due importance in the 1986 administrative review. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween specificity and preferentiality, see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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specific quantifiable provisions of carbon black feedstock and natural gas
to specific identifiable enterprises. That additional enterprises or indus-
tries can participate in the programs, whether theoretically or actually,
does not destroy the programs as subsidies. The programs are appar-
ently available to Mexican enterprises, but in their actual implementa-
tion may result in special bestowals upon specific enterprises.
The rule of not countervailing generally available benefits as devel-
oped by the ITA does not render a correct result in this case. The avail-
ability of carbon black feedstock is not the determinative factor
regarding countervailability. Rather, the inquiry for the ITA is whether
the rates in fact afford the carbon black producers a benefit or competi-
tive advantage. 5
2
At least two fundamentally different views on the meaning of the
case developed. The first interpretation was based on a so-called "ef-
fects" test whereby a subsidy exists if a benefit has an effect on the
competitive position of the recipient vis-A-vis producers of the like
product in the importing country. According to this view, a benefit to
a producer in the exporting country is potentially countervailable if no
similar benefit is available to the producers of the like product in the
importing country. Judge Carman's use of the term specificity it is
argued refers only to the fact that the group of beneficiaries must be
identifiable. Since the users of a road are not easily identifiable, such
benefits would presumably be non-countervailable. If, on the other
hand, there are only few identifiable users of cheap CBFS, a counter-
vailing duty could be imposed.
According to the second view, Cabot upheld the specificity test and
only intended to clarify that Commerce could not limit its investiga-
tion to a mere nominal general availability of benefits, but also had to
look into the possibility of a de facto specificity of benefits. The prob-
lem with this interpretation was that at the time of Cabot Commerce
had already been investigating de facto specificity in earlier cases, a
fact which was expressed poorly in the disputed determination. The
de facto explanation would thus render much of the language of Cabot
unnecessary.5 3
The concern underlying the proposals for an effects test is based on
52. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F.Supp. 722, 732, 734 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
53. See Hunter & Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 510-516; for de facto specificity determinations
prior to Cabot, see, e.g., Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372
(1982); Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,320 (1982); Certain Steel
Products from the Republic of Korea, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,535, 57,537 (1982); Certain Steel Products
from Luxembourg, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,364, 39,371 (1982); Certain Softwood Products from Can-
ada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983); Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Thailand, 49
Fed. Reg. 49,661 (1984) (preliminary determination); Certain Carbon Steel Products from Bra-
'zil, 49 Fed. Reg. 5,157 (1984) (preliminary determination); Oil Country Tubular Goods from
Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,054 (1984).
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the fact that, under the specificity test, no attention is being paid to
whether the producers of like products in the importing country re-
ceive the same or similar "benefits." Objections have been made to
this approach by the injured industry in the importing country for
whom "[a] subsidy does not cease to be a subsidy because it is pro-
vided to more than one beneficiary."'54 According to the supporters of
an effects test, the definition of a countervailable subsidy should there-
fore be based on whether a program has the effect of conferring upon
the recipient(s) a "competitive advantage in international trade."55 In
other words, under an effects test, a potentially countervailable benefit
would exist if the importing industry pays more for a good or service
than the exporting industry.
The flaw of this analysis is that it ignores the concept underlying
the specificity test. If "benefits" accrue to virtually all industries (e.g.,
the grant of $10,000 or the provision of petroleum products below the
free market price) their effects are mitigated or counterbalanced by
other macro-economic factors. A test based on a "competitive advan-
tage" is therefore concerned with effects which, either in whole or in
part, have already been offset. In addition, a definition of a
countervailable subsidy based on a difference between the prices of an
input product in the exporting and the importing country would ig-
nore the principle of comparative advantage under which trade will be
beneficial whenever there are international differences in relative costs
of production.
56
In the section 751 administrative review of the determination un-
derlying Cabot, Commerce subsequently applied a more rigorous de
facto specificity test.57 Nevertheless, it rejected Cabot to the extent
that it required an effects test5 8 and continued to rely on an earlier
court decision which had explicitly upheld the specificity test.59 It also
appealed Cabot, but this appeal was dismissed on the ground that the
remanding order was not a final decision.
60
Subsequent court decisions have made it reasonably clear that the
54. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, Subcommittee on Trade of the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983) (statement of Rep.
Long).
55. See infra note 78; see also Cabot, 620 F.Supp. 722, 731.
56. See generally KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 17 (1985).
57. Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,271 (1986) (final results of administrative
review); see Hunter and Kuhbach, supra note 4, at 518; see also infra notes I I 1-113 and accom-
panying text.
58. See, e.g., Fuel Ethanol from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 3361, 3372 (Dep't. Comm. 1986).
59. Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
60. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
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courts have rejected the effects test and accepted the specificity test as
long as Commerce applies it on a de facto basis. In the case underly-
ing PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States,61 Commerce had determined
that a government program to restructure private firm foreign debts
and the provision of natural gas below world market rates did not
constitute countervailable benefits because both were available to more
than a specific group of enterprises or industries within Mexico. Judge
Carman, who had decided Cabot, upheld these determinations and,
with respect to the provision of natural gas, stated that "[i]t is well
established that the mere existence of a price differential between ex-
ported and domestic prices does not in and of itself confer a bounty or
grant under section 1303."62 Since Commerce had verified that the
Mexican producers paid the published price, its determination ap-
peared to be "in substantial accordance with the statutory
standard." 
63
A week later, Judge Tsoucalas upheld the specificity test with re-
spect to benefits provided under the Spanish bankruptcy law.
64
Shortly thereafter, Judge DiCarlo of the CIT decided Can Am Corp. v.
United States, which, inter alia, again involved the Mexican two-tier
pricing system for oil products. 65 Commerce had decided not to
reinvestigate this practice. The court cited PPG as providing that:
the appropriate standard or test requires Commerce to conduct a de
facto case by case analysis to determine whether or not a program pro-
vides a "subsidy" or a "bounty or grant" to a "specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries" .... In this case, the
Court holds that Commerce acted within its discretion in determining
that all industrial users of fuel oil were not a specific group of enterprises
or industries within Mexico. 66
In July, 1988, Judge Carman decided plaintiff's appeal from Com-
merce's determination in the section 751 administrative review of the
case underlying Cabot.67 In PPG, he had upheld Commerce's defacto
specificity test notwithstanding the fact that Commerce had not ana-
lyzed the precise effects of the programs. Since Commerce had ap-
61. 662 F.Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
62. 662 F.Supp. at 272 (citing United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209, 1216
(Fed. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 443 (1978)).
63. 562 F.2d at 272.
64. A] Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 66 F.Supp. 1206, 1212 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987).
65. Can Am Corp. v. United States, 664 F.Supp. 1444 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
66. 664 F.Supp. at 1448-1449; see also Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States,
669 F.Supp. 445 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); Saudi Iron and Steel Co. (Hadeed) v. United States, 675
F.Supp. 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). These cases contain no reference to a specificity standard
other than the one applied by Commerce.
67. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 694 F.Supp. 949 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
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plied an identical de facto specificity test in its administrative review
determination, it seemed likely that Judge Carman would also uphold
Commerce's determination. Nevertheless, because Commerce had
used the phrase "general availability" rather than "de facto specific-
ity," he remanded the case. It appears that this decision only instructs
Commerce to be more careful with respect to its terminology without
affecting the status of the specificity test itself.
Presently, the appeal of PPG is pending before the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals. This will be the first time that a Court of Appeals
considers the specificity test. Although the case will be decided under
the 1979 legislation, it will be interesting to see to what extent the
decision will be affected by the legislative developments of 1988. Al-
ternatively, it seems unlikely that the specificity debate will end after a
decision by the Court of Appeals regarding PPG, since this decision
will in theory be limited to the law as it was before the 1988
legislation. 68
C. Congress and the Specificity Test
The 1982 steel cases and the 1983 Canadian lumber and Mexican
carbon black investigations received considerable amounts of public
attention. It could therefore be argued that the reasonableness of
Commerce's interpretation of the statutes to require specificity is re-
flected in the fact that Congress did not use the opportunity to clarify
or amend the law, for example, when it enacted the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 (the "1984 Act"). 69 Indeed, there are several places in the
legislative history of the 1984 Act where the non-countervailability of
a benefit is linked to "general availability."' 70 Furthermore, in the
preparation of this Act, Congress rejected legislative provisions which
would have provided that natural resources provided within a country
at below world-market rates are countervailable subsidies.
7'
More important, however, are the history and provisions of the
68. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
69. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
70. See, e.g., Report of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., SUMMARY
OF PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3398 TRADE AND TARIFF ACT OF 1984 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND
THE SENATE, 31 (Comm. Print, 1984); H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1984);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1984).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 4784, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. July
26, 1984); H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1984); see generally Bello & Holmer,
Subsidies and Natural Resources, Congress Rejects a Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test, 18
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 297 (1984); Bello, Current Subsidy and Antidumping Issues
After the Tariff and Trade Act of 1984, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 299 (1985); Bello & Holmer, The
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: The Road to Enactment, INT'L LAW. 287 (1985); Barshefsky,
Diamond & Ellis, Foreign Government Regulation of Natural Resources: Problems and Remedies
Under United States Trade Laws, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 29 (1985).
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specificity test in the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 (the "1988 Act").72
Section 1312 of the 1988 Act renames the old section 771(5) as subpar-
agraph (5)(A) and adds the following subparagraph:
(B) SPECIAL RULE. In applying subparagraph (A), the administering
authority, in each investigation, shall determine whether the bounty,
grant, or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries. Nominal general availa-
bility, under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule establish-
ing a bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis
for determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy is not, or has not been,
in fact, provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.
The provisions on countervailing duty in the 1988 Act are derived
from its predecessor bill, H.R. Rep. No. 3,73 which was vetoed by
President Reagan and should be interpreted in light of the legislative
history of H.R.3. The House bill74 contained a provision that was sim-
ilar in wording to the Senate provision,75 but whereas the Senate Re-
port 76 explained that, under the Senate's version, Commerce only has
to apply a de facto specificity test, the House Report 77 suggested that
an effects test is required.
78
While according to the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade, 79 the conferees adopted the House version,
72. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988).
73. The Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. REP. No. 3,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter "1987 House Bill"] was based on H.R. REP. No. 4800,
99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986). Following markup by several House Committees and consideration
on the floor, the bill was passed by the House of Representatives on May 5, 1987. The Omnibus
Trade Act of 1987, S.1420, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter "Senate Bill"], was based
on the provisions of S.490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1852 (daily ed. Feb. 5,
1987). As reported by the Senate Finance Committee on June 11, 1987, and other Senate com-
mittees, the Senate Bill was passed as an amendment to the House Bill on July 21, 1987. The
final Omnibus Act was passed by the House on April 21, 1988 by a vote of 312 to 107, and by the
Senate on April 27, 1988 by a vote of 63 to 36, with one abstention. After President Reagan
vetoed the bill because of the provisions requiring employers to provide employees with notice of
plant closings and mass layoffs, the Bill was amended and signed by the President on August, 23,
1988.
74. 1987 House Bill, supra note 73, § 153.
75. S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 333, 132 CONG. REc. S1852 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987).
76. S. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1987).
77. H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 1, 123-127 (1988) [hereinafter "1988 House
Report"].
78. The 1988 House Report provides that a countervailable benefit exists if "there is a suffi-
cient degree of competitive advantage in international commerce being bestowed upon a distinct
class of beneficiaries that would not exist but for government action." Id. at 124.
79. 134 CONG. REC. H5522 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Gibbons); see also id.
at S4914 (statement by Sen. Baucus) and 134 CONG. REC. S10,576 (daily ed. August 2, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Baucus).
Michigan Journal of International Law
the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee 80 claimed that the en-
acted provision is based on the Senate version. The text of the enacted
provision is identical to the Senate version. Furthermore, the Confer-
ence report explicitly provides that the House receded with an agree-
ment by the conferees to direct the ITC to conduct a section 332
investigation identifying countries which maintain investment barriers
or other restrictions which effectively prevent foreign capital from
claiming the benefit of foreign government programs on the same
terms as domestic capital,8 ' thereby presumably responding to a con-
cern underlying the House's effects test. It seems correct, therefore, to
assume that the 1988 Act is based on the Senate proposal, that it codi-
fies Commerce's (nominal and de facto) specificity test, and that it re-
jects the effects test.
IV. DETERMINATION OF SPECIFICITY
Now that Congress and the CIT seem to have accepted the speci-
ficity test, its actual application has become one of the most critical
aspects of each countervailing duty determination. It should be
remembered, however, that a specificity determination is, in itself, not
necessarily sufficient to establish the countervailability of a benefit.
Where a government provides goods or services to a limited group of
enterprises, it must still be determined that the government's provision
is based on preferential rates.
A. Sector-specificity
1) General
The specificity test is a tool to determine which benefits cause a
significant distortion in a market economy. On the basis of its experi-
ence in administering the law, Commerce has found that the specificity
test cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical formula. 82 The de-
termination of what constitutes a significant distortion of an economy
requires line drawing on a case-by-case basis. Commerce will there-
fore exercise judgment and balance various factors in analyzing the
facts of a particular case in order to determine whether a countervail-
80. 134 CONG. REC. S4903 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement by Sen. Bentsen); see also id.,
at S4912 (statement by Sen. Packwood).
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. 576, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE &
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 1620.
82. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,456 (1986)
(preliminary determination). For a different view, see Cameron & Berg, The Countervailing Duty
Law and the Principle of General Availability, 19 J.W.T.L. 497, 505 (1985) (authors propose a
test under which there is defacto specificity if the percentage of the total subsidy absorbed by the
industry under a program exceeds that industry's share of the country's gross national product).
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able benefit has been conferred.83 The factors it considers are:
(1) the extent to which a foreign government acts (as demonstrated in
the language of the relevant enacting legislation and implementing regu-
lations) to limit the availability of a program;
(2) the number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof which actu-
ally use a program, which may include the examination of disproportion-
ate or dominant users; and
(3) the extent, and manner in which, the government exercises discre-
tion in making the program available.
84
2) Government restrictions on availability
a) General
The existence of restrictions on access to its benefits does not make
a program specific per se. If the criteria for eligibility are based on
neutral and objective factors (normally economic in nature and appli-
cable to different sectors of the economy) and eligibility is automatic
once the criteria or conditions are met, then the program will in prin-
ciple not be considered specific or countervailable.85 It is, however,
important that eligibility requirements do not predetermine eligible ar-
eas or industries and that no part of the country and no industry is
excluded from eligibility.86 The following examples of eligibility crite-
ria have been determined to constitute a sufficiently broad group of
enterprises or industries and may illustrate Commerce's approach.
1) "Small and medium sized businesses," 87 "small, newly established
companies" 88 or large investments that create jobs.89
2) Companies unable to meet scheduled payments on government guar-
anteed direct dollar debt 90 or "firms having long-term debt in foreign
currency payable abroad." 91
3) All users of marine facilities, including pleasure boats and marine
transportation facilities.
92
The importance of the specific facts of each particular case and the
83. Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,456 (1986).
84. Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,456 (1986); Carbon Steel Wire
Rod from Malaysia, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,303, 13,304.
85. PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 662 F.Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
86. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,332, 39,340 (1982).
87. Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983); Certain Textile
Mill Products and Apparel from Singapore, 50 Fed. Reg. 9840, 9842-43 (1985); Pork Rind Pel-
lets from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,105, 39,106, 39,108 (1983); Forged Undercarriage Compo-
nents from Italy, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,111, 52,113 (1983).
88. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,061-62 (1986).
89. Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372, 39,376 (1982).
90. Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,988, 17,893 (1984).
91. Unprocessed Float Glass From Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,097 (1984); PPG Industries,
Inc. v. U.S., 662 F.Supp. 258, 264 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
92. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,051 (1986).
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fine line between what is and what is not considered specific may be
shown by the example of disaster-relief programs, which have been
found both countervailable93 and non-countervailable. 94 Such a pro-
gram was held countervailable because it included relief in the event of
an "economic disaster" such as an unexpected uncontrollable drop in
prices or the disappearance of a designated level of production in a
designated region beyond the control of producers. 95 Arguably, if the
program involves a wide variety of products, benefits to specific produ-
cers can be based on neutral and objective factors if they were granted
on the basis of an unexpected drop in prices.
b) Agriculture
In light of the extensive agricultural subsidies products worldwide,
it is not surprising that many countervailing duty investigations have
involved agricultural products. 96 Commerce has held that the agricul-
tural sector constitutes more than a single group of enterprises or in-
dustries within the meaning of section 771(5). 97 This means that
subdivisions of the agricultural sector are allowed as long as, again,
the criteria for eligibility are based on neutral and objective factors.
Programs containing the following criteria were not considered to ben-
efit only a specific group of enterprises or industries:
1) All beginning farmers, defined as those who have never owned a via-
ble farm or have never spent a majority of their time or earned a major-
ity of their income from farming assets over which they have had
control.
98
2) Livestock producers and other manufacturers that hold reserve
stocks for maturity purposes (e.g., manufacturers of wine, brandy and
whiskey). 99
3) Farmers certified by provincial authorities as poor farmers or farmers
whose total land area is 10 rai (approximately 4 acres) or less. 100
93. See, e.g., Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed.
Reg. 25,097, 25,106-07 (1985).
94. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,356, 39,360 (1982); Float
Glass from Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,160, 56,161 (1982).
95. Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg.
25,097, 25,106 (1985).
96. The importance of agricultural products in the context of subsidies and countervailing
duties is also shown by § 1326 of the 1988 Act, supra note 72, which adds a special subparagraph
E on the definition of the agricultural industry to section 771(4) (19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1982)).
97. Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,618 (1983); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers
from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 15,007, 15,008 (1984). The fishing industry, however, is considered
specific. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,067 (1986).
98. Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg.
25,097, 25,108 (1985).
99. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708, 37,712 (1985).
100. Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,360 (1986).
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4) Land development programs that require a minimum area. 10 1
5) Users of fertilizers. 102
A program where benefits are conferred to a specific group of agri-
cultural enterprises may form part of a more general policy under
which benefits are conferred upon a wide variety of industries. If there
is sufficient linkage between the specific programs and the overall pol-
icy, Commerce considers such a program to be non-countervailable.
This requires, however, that the different programs involve similar
benefits on comparable terms.10 3 This issue may be particularly im-
portant in cases involving price support and stabilization programs.
Such benefits will not be found countervailable if objective and identifi-
able criteria automatically trigger the aid mechanism for (a sufficient
amount of) agricultural products, and the level of support for different
commodities at various times is comparable. 14 On the other hand, if
payments with respect to certain products are pre-authorized, while
payment for others are unpredictable because they need approval, the
program may be found countervailable, regardless of whether the ad-
ministering authority is guided by objective factors in selecting the
designated commodities. 105
According to Commerce, the agricultural price stabilization pro-
grams of the European Communities do not contain sufficient linkage
between products since production refunds are made available to
processors of selected fruits and vegetables in specific amounts relating
to the competitiveness of each product in the world market.106 Like-
wise, Commerce considered benefits provided under the Canadian Ag-
ricultural Stabilization Act countervailable. Even though they were
part of a nationwide fabric of programs covering many farm products,
101. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708, 37,712 (1985).
102. Lamb Meat from New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708, 37,711-12 (1985). The low cost
fertilizer was provided in order to encourage adequate pasture maintenance by farmers. In an-
other case, Commerce considered benefits under a program for "industries which utilize green-
house technology in the growth of food and ornamentals" to be limited to specific industries.
Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2134, 2137 (1987).
103. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,046, 10,050,
10,052, 10,053, & 10,057 (1986) (holding that the program under investigation was not suffi-
ciently linked to an alleged general policy).
104. See, e.g., Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,358 (1986); Lamb Meat from
New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,708, 37,712 (1985).
105. Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg.
25,097 (1985); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.Supp. 445 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987). Nevertheless, since the existence of government discretion does not make a pro-
gram countervailable, see infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text, it seems that if a govern-
ment applies objective criteria no countervailing duty should be imposed.
106. Tomato Products from the European Community, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,825 (1979) (prelimi-
nary determination); Dextrines and Soluble or Chemically Treated Starches Derived from Corn
Starch from the European Community, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,414 (1980); see also Fresh Cut Flowers
from Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 15,007, 15,010-11 (1984).
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benefits under this act were only available to selected agricultural pro-
ducers, and the level of price stabilization varied from commodity to
commodity. 107
3) Number of actual users and disproportionate use
In its case-by-case analysis, Commerce examines both program eli-
gibility and participation. It is generally more difficult to give an ab-
stract description of when a subsidy is considered defacto specific than
is the case with other factors which are considered relevant for a speci-
ficity determination. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that when
determining which benefits are countervailable, Commerce will be
aware of the fact that in administering its countervailing duty laws it
may set a precedent for its trading partners. 10 8 The determination that
all agriculture in Mexico was not a "specific group of enterprises or
industries" is an example of this. If Commerce had found the provi-
sion of irrigation water to agriculture countervailable, it would have
invited the imposition of countervailing duties by other countries or
the European Communities on U.S. irrigation-based agricultural
exports. 09
Shortly after Cabot was decided, Commerce completed the prelim-
inary results of the section 751 administrative review of the underlying
determination, Carbon Black from Mexico.'"0 It continued to hold
that a difference between the domestic and export prices of natural gas
107. Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg.
25,097, 25,100 (1985); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.Supp. 445 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1987); see also Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,359 (1986); Lamb Meat
from New Zealand, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,709, 37,712 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983)
(testimony by Alan F. Holmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration).
109. Fresh Asparagus from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,618, 21,621 (1983). See Horlick, Cur-
rent Issues in Countervailing Duty Law, in THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 - FOUR
YEARS LATER 7, 37 (1983). The risk of mirror-legislation was also shown by a threatened coun-
tervailing duty investigation in 1980 by the Commission of the European Communities into syn-
thetic fiber exports from the U.S. that benefitted from price controls of natural gas. Hearing,
supra note 108 (statement by Alan F. Holmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Adminis-
tration); see also G. HUFBAUER & J. ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 95 (1984). In
a later determination, Commerce supported its decision that the agricultural sector in Mexico
constituted more than a specific group of enterprises by stating that "approximately one-third of
Mexico's labor force is employed in agriculture," Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Mexico, 49
Fed. Reg. 15,007, 15,008 (1984), but it did not give such figures when it made the same determi-
nation with respect to the Brazilian and the Canadian agricultural sectors. Fuel Ethanol from
Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 3361, 3363-64, 3370 (1986); Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork
Products from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097 (1985); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from
Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041 (1986); Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg.
2134, 2135, 2137 (1987).




did not itself constitute a domestic subsidy, but changed its position
regarding CBFS. It stated that, with respect to the provision of CBFS,
it had placed excessive emphasis on the limitations on the amount of
potential users inherent to the product and determined that "there are
too few users of CBFS for us to find that it is provided on a generally
available basis.""' In its final determination, Commerce affirmed this
position. 112
Commerce also re-investigated imports of softwood lumber from
Canada." t3 In its 1983 determination it had found that the low prices
for the right to cut lumber (stumpage rights) benefitted a wide variety
of industries and concluded that such a benefit was therefore not
countervailable.114 In its 1986 preliminary determination, however, it
changed its position. Commerce held that its earlier conclusion was
called into question by two facts. First, one of the industries men-
tioned in its earlier determination, the furniture manufacturing indus-
try, did not benefit much from the stumpage programs. More
importantly, the paper and pulp industries, which were the main bene-
ficiaries of the stumpage programs, tended to be horizontally inte-
grated into single enterprises with the lumber industry. Because
Commerce also found the existence of governmental discretion, it pre-
liminarily determined that the stumpage programs were limited to a
specific group of industries and thus conferred potentially countervail-
able benefits." t5
This preliminary determination of disproportionate use seems in-
correct. A horizontal integration between industries should be irrele-
vant in the context of countervailing duty law. Section 771(4)(A)"16
defines the term "industry" strictly on the basis of producers of a "like
product." It is therefore possible that certain integrated enterprises
remain as several industries for purposes of the countervailing duty
law. Furthermore, in the Mexican cases, once agriculture was deter-
111. Id. at 13,271. Under an "inherent nature" test not only the amount of recipients, but
also the nature of a benefit relevant. In the first Canadian Lumber case, for example, Commerce
found the "forest products industry" to be not a specific group of industries for purposes of
stumpage programs, but held other programs for the same group of enterprises involving benefits
which would be of use to other industries as well as being countervailable. Certain Softwood
Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,182 (1983).
112. Carbon Black from Mexico, Fed. Reg. 30,385 (1986). This case offers an illustration of
the situation where a defacto specific benefit is not per se countervailable. Since similar products
were provided on comparable conditions, CBFS was not provided on preferential terms. See
infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
113. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986) (prelimi-
nary determination).
114. Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,167 (1983).
115. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
116. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
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mined to be a field that included more than a specific group of enter-
prises and industries, Commerce should have rejected petitions against
programs that affect a significantly wider segment of a country's in-
dustry, such as stumpage rights in Canada.
4) Government discretion in conferring the benefit
If a program does not give specific guidelines to be followed by the
administering authority, Commerce will review the procedures for ap-
proving or rejecting applications for benefits. If no standard criteria
are applied, Commerce will hold the benefits to be countervailable.
Furthermore, if a government does not provide sufficient information
to enable Commerce to determine whether a program is being admin-
istered in a manner that limits the benefits to specific industries, Com-
merce will hold the program to be countervailable. 17 Finally, the
mere possibility of judicial review is not considered sufficient to pre-
vent a government from using its discretion to target certain
industries. ' ' 8
As discussed above, after Cabot, Commerce revisited its 1983 de-
termination regarding Canadian stumpage rights. Although its deter-
mination was influenced by the fact that the defendants had not
provided adequate responses, Commerce preliminarily determined
that the exercise of governmental discretion had led to the provision of
stumpage to a specific group of enterprises and industries. 19 In addi-
tion to making this controversial determination concerning the use of
the stumpage programs, Commerce also incorrectly analyzed the
existence of governmental discretion. An examination of the use of
discretion is, in fact, aimed at determining the intent of a foreign gov-
ernment. Commerce should only investigate such intent if the effects
of a measure or program are unclear. 120 Therefore, Commerce should
117. See, e.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Malaysia, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,303, 13,304 (1988).
118. Certain Steel Products from The Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372, 39,374 (1982).
119. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,457 (1986)
(preliminary determination). The preliminary determination had sufficient impact to cause the
Canadian government and exporters to accept a settlement under which the lumber exports to
the United States were subjected to a special export tax. See generally, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
6 (Jan. 7, 1987); Holmer and Bello, The U.S.-Canada Lumber Agreement: Past as Prologue, 21
INT'L LAW. 1185 (1987). After the plaintiffs had withdrawn their petition, Commerce termi-
nated the investigation and stated that the preliminary affirmative determination was henceforth
"without legal force and effect." Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 2751
(1987) (termination of investigation). Two Commerce officials have stated, however, that the
preliminary determination is still "an accurate description of how Commerce applies the speci-
ficity test." Hunter & Kuhbach, supra note 54, at 523; see, e.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Malaysia, 53 Fed. Reg. 13,303 (1988).
120. The countervailing duty law is concerned with the effects of foreign government prac-
tices, not with its purposes or intentions. ASG Industries v. United States, 467 F.Supp. 1195
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first investigate whether a benefit in fact accrues to a wide range of
industries. If so, the benefit is non-specific and cannot be counter-
vailed. If, however, there is no evidence whether a program benefits
different sectors in the economy, Commerce may further investigate
whether the granting government has any discretion and how such
discretion is exercised.
In the second Canadian lumber case, however, Commerce reversed
this order. It determined, first, the existence of a discretionary alloca-
tion of stumpage rights and only then discussed the question of how
many industries benefitted from the stumpage rights.121 Again, the
existence and use of discretionary powers for the granting authority
under a program are irrelevant provided that more than a limited
group of industries benefit from it. Where the effect of a program is
non-distortive because the benefits accrue to many industries, an inves-
tigation into the intent of the granting authority becomes superfluous
and only risks reducing the objectivity of the outcome of an
investigation.
B. Regional subsidies and specificity
Commerce presently deals with regional subsidies by considering
each program in which benefits are limited to less than all regions of a
relevant jurisdiction. If the program is limited to a specific group of
enterprises or industries, it is thus potentially countervailable.
122
Hence, benefits granted by local governments throughout their juris-
diction are not countervailable, whereas benefits from the federal gov-
ernment to all industries in exactly the same area (or, in the case of a
joint federal-local program, the federal shares of the benefits) are con-
sidered specific and thus potentially countervailable.
t23
If all regions get a benefit from the federal or national government,
Commerce will determine the existence of a subsidy by comparing the
benefit under investigation with the average level of assistance pro-
vided to companies in the region with the lowest benefit.124 Further-
(Cust. Ct. 1979); see also Saudi Iron and Steel Co. (Hadeed) v. United States, 675 F.Supp. 1362
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
121. For an evaluation of the de facto specificity in this case, see supra notes 113-16 and
accompanying text.
122. In another instance, Commerce held countervailable a Mexican program that provided
benefits to all areas of Mexico with the exception of Mexico City and environs. Portland Hydrau-
lic Cement Clinker from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,500, 44,502 (1986); see also Fuel Ethanol from
Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 3361, 3363 (1986).
123. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,345, 39,345 (1982); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041,
10,048 (1986).
124. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,045 (1986).
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more, it is not sufficient for a non-specificity determination that the
designation of regions is based on neutral criteria. Unless such desig-
nations are merely used for administrative convenience, 25 all benefits
conferred by programs where the region of the applicant is determina-
tive of the level of assistance will in principle be countervailable.1
26
The CIT has upheld Commerce's determinations concerning regional
subsidies on several occasions.'
27
In the 1982 steel cases, the Commission of the European Commu-
nities argued that regional aids did not affect international trade and
could not be considered countervailable.128 Commerce rejected this
argument and held:
While there is no agreed definition of the term 'normal competition'
in the context of the GATT, the term can be reasonable constured [sic]
to include comparative advantage, a concept about which there is little,
if any, serious dispute among economists. The argument of the E.C.
flows against the logic of comparative advantage. Subsidies used to alter
the comparative advantage of certain regions with respect to the produc-
tion of a certain product or products are by definition distortive of trade
.and the allocation of resources, and, therefore must affect normal com-
petition, including competition with producers in the market of the im-
porting country.
Commerce's analysis of regional subsidies has at least two funda-
mental flaws. First, the appropriate test for the determination of a
distortive benefit is based on discrimination between producers, not
between regions. In theory, as long as a government does not favor
one sector over another, neither the pattern of production nor the pat-
tern of trade will be affected. Only the pattern of location of industries
changes. 29 If the benefits of a regional development program
overcompensate the initial disadvantages of the area, enterprises from
all different sectors would locate in that area and the benefits would be
125. See, e.g., Certain Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg.
39,345, 39,349 (1982).
126. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,065-66
(1986). The Canadian respondents are challenging this decision before the CIT on the basis that
the classification of regions was based on neutral factors (poverty), just like the German Steel
case, supra note 125.
127. See, e.g., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F.Supp. 834, 838, n.6 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1983); United Steel Corp. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 245 (1983); Hercules,
Inc. v. United States, 673 F.Supp. 454, 477 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
128. Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,329 (1982).
129. Arguably, the producers which already had a comparative advantage in the region will
be able to benefit more from the development program than producers which did badly in that
area in the first place. However, just like all governmental measures of a general nature will
affect certain sectors more than others, these types of benefits should not be considered
countervailable since they will normally not cause any significant distortions. Furthermore, this
analysis may be different if there is only a specific group of industries in the subsidized region and
high costs prevent other industries from locating in that area.
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offset by other macro-economic factors (e.g., inflation or a tax in-
crease), similar to a situation where the government gives a 10% pro-
duction "subsidy" to all enterprises in the whole country. t 30
Programs under which benefits are conferred upon all enterprises and
industries in a specific region should therefore not be countervailable.
There is nothing in the statutory law or case law that prevents Com-
merce from determining which regional development schemes which
do not discriminate between different sectors of an economy provide
benefits to more than a specific group of industries and are therefore
non-countervailable. 131
Commerce's assumption that regional subsidies necessarily affect
competition in the importing country's market is incorrect for a sec-
ond reason. Even if a government limits the benefits of a regional de-
velopment program to a specific enterprise in industry, and therefore
distorts the pattern of production, international trade is not necessar-
ily affected. If, for example, the cost of production for widgets in the
importing country is 150 and in regions A and B of the exporting
country 100 and 110, respectively, a subsidy of 10 or less on the wid-
gets from region B will normally have no effects on international trade.
Although the regional development program may reduce the welfare
of the exporting country as a whole, neither the export price of the
widgets nor international trade will be affected. Such trade effects
130. Development grants that overcompensate the initial disadvantages of a region attract
investment from other parts of the country until the moment in time where there are no addi-
tional benefits in investing there. Where the benefits are so large that they cause all industry of
the country located in that area to relocate, the effect of the program would be the same as giving
a grant to all industries on a country wide basis.
131. Commerce already applies a similar analysis in the case of infrastructure. Infrastructure
is, by its very nature, available only for use by companies and individuals located in the vicinity
of such facilities. Commerce has therefore determined that the provision of basic infrastructure
should be subject to a test that is less rigid than one generally applicable to regional subsidies.
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 51 Fed. Reg. 4206, 4210 (1986); Certain Textiles and
Textile Mill Products from Malaysia, 50 Fed. Reg. 9852 (1985); Portland Hydraulic Cement and
Cement Clinker from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063, 43,065 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 44,500 (admin.
review) (1986). The provision of basic infrastructure will not be considered a coun-
tervailable subsidy when the following three conditions are met:
(i) The government does not limit who can move into the area where the infrastructure
has been built.
(ii) The infrastructure is in fact used by more than a specific enterprise or industry, or
group of enterprises or industries and thus benefits more than a specific enterprise
or industry.
(iii) The enterprises that locate in the area should have equal access or receive the bene-
fits of the infrastructure on equal terms or on the basis of neutral criteria. See, e.g.,
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Saudi Arabia, 51 Fed. Reg. 4206, 4210 (1986); Certain
Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,053, 10,062,
10,065, 10,067-68 (1986); Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,360 (1986).
Thus, even if there are no other trains, roads or railways in any other part of a country, as long as
the benefits accrue to a wide range of industries in the region with a developed infrastructure,
Commerce would find no countervailable benefit.
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only occur to the extent that regional benefits overcompensate the dis-
location costs.13 2 As will be discussed in detail below, under the pres-
ent system of the countervailing duty law, the ITC's injury
determination cannot adequately deal with these effects on trade. An
amendment to the statute would therefore be required to enable Com-
merce to subtract dislocation costs from the net amount of the sector-
specific regional subsidy found.
133
V. Specificity and Preferentiality
The concept of a countervailable benefit is based upon discrimina-
tion between market participants by government in favor of a specific
group of industries. Thus, when a government provides goods and
services, a potentially countervailable benefit exists to the extent that
such goods and services are provided to a specific group of industries
at preferential prices. 134 However, where there are no other users of a
good or service provided by government, the question of whether cer-
tain producers have been favored over others because of preferential
treatment becomes complicated. In such cases, the selection of a
benchmark for the purpose of determining preferentiality may, in fact,
determine whether a countervailable benefit will be found. In the car-
bon black case, for example, specificity and preferentiality were the
same issue. The appropriate question was not whether there was de
facto specificity, but whether other industries obtained similar benefits.
After an imprecise original determination, Commerce corrected itself
in its administrative review, determining that although the use was
limited to a specific industry, CBFS was not provided at preferential
rates, because other industries obtained comparable products at simi-
132. There are, of course, several caveats to this analysis. The first is that it may be impossi-
ble in each countervailing duty investigation to assess accurately the difference in costs of pro-
duction between two regions, because the local disadvantages of the underdeveloped area may
already be partially or completely offset by other advantages. In Michelin Tire Corp. v. United
States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143, 164-5, vacated as moot, slip op. 85-11 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), for
example, the wages in the disadvantaged region (Nova Scotia) were alleged to be only 81.3 per-
cent of those in Ontario. The court found that the wage advantage of locating in Nova Scotia
outweighed all disadvantages it might have experienced. In addition, it found several intangible
benefits of the disadvantaged region: (1) it was not a st ronghold of competitive interests, so that,
in general, the locating enterprise could expect a closer cooperation from local government, (2)
there was no separatist movement which would have presented special difficulties and (3) the
relatively remote location would make it easier to safeguard trade secrets.
Second, it is possible that an expansion of the widgets plant in A would have caused the input
products or labor to become more expensive in that region and, thus, could only have occurred at
higher than 100 per unit cost. The location in other areas may take away such upward pressures
on the prices of inputs in region A. An accurate calculation of the difference in costs of produc-
tion between the different regions would have to take these effects into account as well.
133. See supra note 34-35 and infra notes 152-3 and accompanying text.




As explained above, the question of whether a government mea-
sure distorts competition or is offset by other macro-economic factors
should be viewed within the economy of the jurisdiction in which the
benefit is conferred. For the purpose of calculating preferentiality,
comparisons within the same political jurisdiction are also the most
appropriate measure of the existence of preferentiality, "regardless of
whether those actions cause prices within the jurisdiction to differ
from prices elsewhere."' 3 6 In its preliminary determination in the ad-
ministrative review of Carbon Black from Mexico, 137 Commerce gave
a list of alternatives with which it compares the price of a good or
service in order to determine whether the recipients had been given
preferential treatment:
1) Prices charged (to users within the same jurisdiction) by the same
seller for a similar or related good.
2) Prices charged within the jurisdiction by other sellers for an identical
good or service.
3) The same seller's cost of producing the good or service.
4) External prices, such as the export or world market price. 138
Under the first three alternatives, the goods and the price for the
goods that are used as a preferentiality benchmark have to be gener-
ally available in that jurisdiction, but not necessarily outside that juris-
diction. In the case of carbon black, for example, it would not have
mattered if there were a difference between the export price and the
price for domestic use of "number six fuel," the petroleum derivative
that was considered a similar good. As long as a country provides
similar petroleum derivatives to all domestic users at similarly low
prices, the effects of such measures are presumably counterbalanced or
mitigated by other macro-economic factors.
VI. SPECIFICITY AND GATT
Neither articles VI or XVI of the GATT nor the Subsidies Code139
contain a detailed definition of a countervailable subsidy. The only
reference to specificity is made in article 11 of the Subsidies Code. In
the third paragraph of this provision, the signatories of the code recog-
nize that legitimate social and economic policy objectives may be
achieved "by means of subsidies granted with the aim of giving an
135. See supra note 51.
136. Preferentiality Appendix to Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,269, 13,272
(1986) (preliminary results of admin. review).
137. Id. at 13,272.
138. Id. at 13,272-73.
139. See supra note 12.
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advantage to certain enterprises" and "note that the above form of
subsidies are normally granted either regionally or by sector." Never-
theless, article 11 is, strictly speaking, unrelated to the rules relating to
the imposition of countervailing duties; it belongs to Part II of the
Subsidies Code which, interpreting articles XVI and XXIII of the
GATT, provides international rules concerning the use of subsidies.
In Commerce's opinion, the recognition of the legitimacy of the
use of sectoral or regional subsidies in article 11 does not prohibit any
country to impose countervailing duties on sector or region-specific
subsidies. 40 It has taken the position that, absent an internationally
agreed upon definition, it may define a potentially countervailable sub-
sidy on the basis of specificity and include sectoral or regional aids. 14'
An international agreement on specificity was nearly reached on
April 25, 1985, when the GATT Group of Experts on the Calculation
of the Amount of a Subsidy submitted draft guidelines on specificity to
the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 14
2
These guidelines adopt a specificity requirement and provide that a
benefit provided by government accrues to a wide range of industries
should not be countervailable. Apparently, the continuing contro-
versy in the United States over the specificity test in the context of
natural resources has prevented the adoption of the GATT guidelines.
One of the reasons to adopt a narrow concept of a countervailable
benefit is to reduce the trade friction caused by the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties. The more such a concept is based on generally ac-
cepted and fairly objective standards, the more it will serve this
purpose. The fairly wide consensus regarding the appropriateness of
the specificity test which exists among trading partners of the United
States increases its practical importance.
VII. A SECOND STAGE SPECIFICITY TEST FOR
UPSTREAM SUBSIDIES?
A. General
A subsidy on one product can indirectly affect the production or
manufacture of another good. One form of such an indirect subsidiza-
tion occurs when a subsidized product is used as an input in the pro-
140. Appendix 4 to Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,330
(1982). Nevertheless, in the controversy on natural resources, it argued that the specificity test
was required by the Subsidies Code. See e.g.,, supra note 108.
141. Appendix 4 to Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,330 (1982). The
CIT has upheld this position. See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.Supp. 454, 477 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1987).
142. SCM/W/89. These guidelines are reprinted as an appendix hereto.
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duction of another product. To the extent that the subsidy to the
input producer (the "upstream industry") causes the price of the input
to be lower than the market rate absent such a subsidy, it will confer a
benefit to the producer of the final merchandise (the "downstream in-
dustry") and may be considered as an indirect subsidy to the latter.
The specificity test may play a role in two stages of an investigation
involving such "upstream subsidies." First, the benefit provided to the
input producer must accrue to not more than a limited group of enter-
prises and, second, the artificially depressed price of the input product
should not benefit a wide variety of industries. In the case of a grant
to steel producers, for example, a first stage specificity test will ques-
tion whether this benefit has been granted exclusively to that specific
industry. Alternatively, a second stage specificity test will be con-
cerned with the question how many downstream enterprises or indus-
tries benefit from the subsidized steel. This section deals with the
question whether U.S. countervailing duty law does or should contain
such a second stage specificity test. In other words, should it make a
difference in a countervailing duty investigation concerning imported
tools whether the subsidized steel used as an input to the tools is also
used for the production of cars?
B. Trade effects of upstream subsidies
For an analysis of the possible trade distorting effects of a "pass
through" of a subsidy on an input product to the producer of the final
merchandise, one should distinguish between the situation in which
the subsidy has resulted in a price for the input product that is lower
than the free market price for that input, and where it has not had this
effect. For example, a subsidy on the domestic production of steel in
country A which does not result in an undercutting of the price of
other available suppliers, but merely offsets a disadvantage of country
A's domestic steel industry, may displace sales of foreign steel on that
market. It need not, however, affect production of, and trading in, any
downstream product. Since steel is not the "like product" of tools,
countervailing duties may not be imposed on cars or imported tools in
order to protect the injured steel industry of the importing country. 43
If, on the other hand, the subsidized input product undercuts the
market price for such products, one may further investigate to what
143. According to GATT article VI:6, countervailing duties may only be imposed on im-
ported products to protect the domestic industry of the "like product" of the product under
investigation. It is debatable whether the same is true in cases where, under U.S. law, no injury
test is required. Arguably, the concept of "like product" is irrelevant in such cases.
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extent the subsidy to the input producer has been passed through to
the producer of the merchandise under investigation.
C. Second/stage Specificity
The 1984 Act added specific provisions on the countervailability of
upstream subsidies to the 1930 Act.' 44 Section 771A(a) defines the
term "upstream subsidy" as:
any subsidy described in section 771(5)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) ... that (1) is
paid or bestowed with respect to a product ... that is used in the manu-
facture or production ... of merchandise which is the subject of counter-
vailing duty proceeding; (2) in the judgment of the administering
authority bestows a competitive benefit on the merchandise; and (3) has
a significant effect on the cost of manufacturing or producing of the
merchandise. !45
In one of the first determinations under this provision, Commerce
rejected the argument that a second stage specificity test was required
under section 771A. 146 It preliminarily determined that "nothing in
the statute or legislative history supports this contention." 47 In its
final determination, however, Commerce determined that the passing
on of the benefit, if any, to a downstream producer did not have a
significant effect on the cost of tool production. Therefore, Commerce
did not have to make any final determination concerning the need for
second stage specificity and the preliminary findings remain the only
indication of Commerce's position on this issue.
Supporting Commerce's preliminary determination is the notion
that the practical justification for a specificity requirement, i.e. the ad-
ministrative and political need to limit the definition of a countervail-
able subsidy, is not equally applicable in the case of benefits passed on
to downstream producers, given the statutory definition of an up-
stream subsidy. The "competitive benefit" and "significant effect" re-
quirements of section 771A(a) will normally prevent the
countervailability of many potential upstream subsidies. For example,
even if a subsidy to steel producers is passed on, and benefits a wide
144. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677-1 (1982). See generally Bello, Current Subsidy and Antidumping
Issues After the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 21 STAN. J. INT'L L. 299, 322-328; Giesen, Up-
stream Subsidies. Policy and Enforcement Questions after the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 17
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 241 (1985).
145. It is unclear why subsection (iv) of Section 771(5)(B) was omitted in this reference.
146. Agricultural Tillage Tools from Brazil, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,270, 24,272 (1985) (preliminary
determination).
147. Id. But see Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge and U.S. Trade
Representative William E. Brock to the Hon. Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on
Ways and Means (April 3, 1984).
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range of industries, it will, in practice, probably not have a significant
effect on the cost of production of many downstream products.
Nevertheless, second-stage specificity should be required before
countervailing duties can be imposed on products that benefit from an
upstream subsidy. First, in enacting the upstream subsidy provisions
in the 1984 Act, Congress, inter alia, intended to codify Commerce's
prior practice. 148 Since Commerce had applied a second stage specific-
ity test in the 1982 steel cases, Congress arguably endorsed such a
test. 149 Second, it would be inconsistent to require specificity for the
imposition of countervailing duties where the government chooses to
subsidize directly, for example, through the provision of steel pro-
duced by government-owned enterprises, while not applying such a
test where the same benefit is conferred upon the downstream industry
through subsidization of an input produced by a third party.
150
VIII. LIMITATIONS OF THE SPECIFICITY TEST
A. Sector-specific Subsidies and Efficiency
As noted above, the definition of a countervailable subsidy is based
on the concept that the market forces of supply and demand provide
the most profitable allocation of resources. Since measures of a gen-
eral nature do not (significantly) affect such allocation of resources,
they should not be considered countervailable. Alternatively, govern-
mental provision of benefits to only a specific group of enterprises or
industries encourages inefficient production and thereby reduces
welfare.
Although this might be true with regard to perfectly competitive
free markets, it is incorrect to assume that all benefits accruing to a
specific group of enterprises or industries are inefficient in practice.
There are many instances where the market forces of supply and de-
mand are distorted and fail to provide for the most efficient and profit-
able allocation of scarce resources. Such distortions may be caused,
for example, by the existence of positive external economies or market
rigidities. A positive external economy exists where the benefits to so-
ciety as a whole of the production of a good exceed the private margi-
nal benefits for a producer. To illustrate, an industry may draw many
148. 130 CONG. REC. S11,371 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984).
149. See, e.g., Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Rod from Spain, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,723, 28,726
(1982); Certain Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,321,
26,325 (1982) (preliminary determination); Certain Carbon Steel Products from The United
Kingdom, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,384, 39,390 (1982); see also supra note 148.
150. See also H. BESELER AND N. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW,
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 127 (1986).
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tourists to the region where it is located. In the case of market rigidi-
ties, the supply and demand for resources do not respond smoothly to
price inducements. This may be the case where the influence of unions
drives up the price of labor. In such circumstances, a government sub-
sidy may be the most appropriate solution to correct such a market
distortion or failure, thereby increasing the profitability of the alloca-
tion of resources.' 5'
When such a distortion or market failure occurs across the differ-
ent sectors of an economy, benefits granted to correct such a distortion
or market failure would normally accrue to different industries and
therefore not be held countervailable. However, even if such market
distortion or failure (or the government action to correct it or compen-
sate for its effects) is limited to a specific industry, a subsidy to that
specific industry may increase the profitability of the allocation of
scarce resources and could therefore be considered efficient. However,
because a subsidy granted to correct a distortion limited to specific
industries will only affect a limited group of enterprises, it will be con-
sidered potentially countervailable under the present countervailing
duty. The specificity test does not deal with, and is not aimed at,
preventing the imposition of countervailing duties to offset sector-spe-
cific subsidies that are intended to increase the efficiency of the alloca-
tion of resources.
B. Subsidies that do not affect trade
In addition to subsidies that affect international trade but cannot
be considered inefficient, there are subsidies which may reduce a coun-
try's welfare but do not necessarily affect competition abroad. This
may be the case when subsidies are granted to encourage investment in
certain parts of a country. As long as the price or volume of the ex-
ported goods is not affected, it should not matter for the United States
whether the goods are produced in region A or in region B of the
exporting country. 
52
Subsidies for research and development (R&D) may provide an-
other illustration that all subsidies do not necessarily distort trade.
Under certain programs, results of the R&D have to be published and
thus made available to foreign competitors. Whether or not the R&D
151. Barcelo, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 794-835 (1977); Denton & O'Cleiracrain, Subsidy Issues in International
Commerce 5-16 (Trade Policy Research Centre, 1972); Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 229-32 (1989).
152. For a more extensive discussion of regional subsidies, see supra, note 132 and accompa-
nying text.
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subsidy itself is inefficient, it is difficult to understand how such a pro-
gram which provides an equal benefit to the industry of the like prod-
uct in the importing country could distort international
ompetition. 15 3 In such cases, if the producers of the importing coun-
try (who also benefit from the R&D results) are nevertheless injured
by other advantages of the imported goods, protection should be given
through safeguard measures rather than through the imposition of
countervailing duties.
C. Commerce should be allowed to subtract more types of benefits
from the gross amount of subsidies found
In most investigations, no countervailing duties can be imposed
unless the ITC determines that imported goods, through the effects of
the subsidy, injure the producers of the like product in the importing
country. One would expect that the determination would therefore
include an analysis of the trade effects of the subsidy under investiga-
tion. Indeed, the trade effects of subsidies could in theory be taken
into account in the ITC's analysis of the cause of the injury. In prac-
tice, however, such causation analysis is complicated by the existence
of multiple causes of an industry's injury.1
54
Nevertheless, even if an effective analysis for the causation of the
injury were applied by the ITC, the issue of subsidies not affecting
trade could still not be dealt with satisfactorily under U.S. law. The
153. Although Commerce holds regional subsidies countervailable, it does not consider these
types of R&D benefits countervailable, thereby acknowledging the need for a concept of a sub-
sidy that also requires a distortion in trade. See, e.g., Fuel Ethanol from Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg.
3361, 3366, 3372 (1986); Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 30,319
(1982); Certain Steel Products from Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,356, 39,358 (1982); Certain Atlantic
Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,053 (1986). But see also Agrexco, Agric.
Export Co. v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 1238, 1242 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
154. To isolate the effects of the subsidy one may apply a so-called "margins analysis."
Under this analysis, the investigating authority considers the impact of the amount of the subsidy
as a margin of the price and the competitive advantage of the imported product. If, for example,
the U.S. market price of a widget is 150 and imported widgets cost 75, a subsidy of 2 bestowed on
the production of widgets abroad would probably not be considered a material cause of injury to
the U.S. producers under a margins analysis. However, while the subsidy margin is an important
consideration, it may not always suffice for an accurate causation determination. A margins
analysis does not take into consideration other relevant economic factors, such as the price-
elasticities of supply of and demand for the products and, presently, only a minority of the ITC
commissioners seems to apply a margins analysis. The others investigate whether the imports,
rather than the subsidy alone, cause injury, an analysis not fundamentally different from that
applied for the purpose of safeguard measures.
The courts have provided that the statute does not mandate a margins analysis, but does not
prohibit it either. Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F.Supp. 1237, 1241-43 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1982); Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F.Supp. 552 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988). A
recent development is the additional attention that is paid to the price elasticities of the supply
and demand of the product under investigation. See, e.g., Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd.,
669 F.Supp. 445 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); USX Corp. v. United States, 698 F.Supp. 234 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988).
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present system of the countervailing duty law divides the responsibility
for determinations between two different agencies. After Commerce
has determined the existence and calculated the amount of a
countervailable benefit, the ITC has to determine that U.S. producers
have been, or are threatened to be, injured. Most countervailing duty
investigations, however, involve benefits provided under different pro-
grams. Commerce has to determine whether and to what degree these
benefits have been bestowed on the imports under investigation with-
out being able to distinguish between different types of benefits in-
volved. 155 The ITC, however, is only concerned with the aggregate
amount of the subsidies found by Commerce. Hence, if Commerce
finds both injurious and trade-neutral benefits, and the injury determi-
nation is in the affirmative, a duty will be imposed at the rate of the
aggregate amount of subsidies found. Since, the injury investigation
by the ITC is not aimed at determining the efficiency aspect of subsi-
dies and is not always capable of dealing with the issue of benefits that
do not affect trade, Commerce should be allowed to apply additional
tests in its subsidy determination.
Since it is administratively impossible for Commerce to make de-
tailed analyses of the economic effects of each specific subsidy, it has to
rely on abstract principles. The present assumption that subsidies are
inefficient and distort trade is fair and should remain. The exporting
country, however, should be able to rebut this presumption by proving
that a benefit is efficient or, more importantly, does not affect trade.
Commerce should subsequently be able to deduct those benefits from
the aggregate amount of subsidies found. Under the present law, this
is possible only in a limited amount of cases. The Treasury Depart-
ment apparently used its administrative discretion to handle cases in
such a way that no countervailing duties were imposed to offset subsi-
dies that did not affect trade. 156 In 1974, however, Congress, frus-
trated with the lax enforcement of the countervailing duty law and
conscious of the need for more import protection after the lowering of
U.S. tariff barriers, imposed specific time limits within which the
Treasury Department (and later Commerce) had to make its determi-
nations. 157 The 1979 Act subsequently explicitly limited the types of
deductions from the gross amount of benefits found. '5 8 Unless this list
is expanded to include efficiency-enhancing benefits that are sector-
specific, and benefits that do not affect international trade, counter-
155. See, e.g., Rice from Thailand, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,356, 12,358, 12,364 (1986).
156. See supra note 30.
157. See supra note 30.
158. See supra note 34.
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vailing duties will be imposed to offset practices that do not warrant
the application of the countervailing duty law.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The specificity test is now firmly rooted in U.S. countervailing duty
law and practice. After many confusing decisions, it seems reasonably
clear that the courts have accepted the appropriateness of this stan-
dard. Likewise, it appears that Congress has codified the specificity
test in the provisions of the 1988 Act.
The specificity requirement is, generally speaking, a useful test. It
has a sound economic rationale. Furthermore, without creating an
impossible administrative burden, it creates a fairly objective and oper-
ational standard for determining which benefits should be non-
countervailable since they do not distort the patterns of production in
a country significantly. The fact that outside the United States there
appears to be a consensus regarding the appropriateness of the test
may help to further reduce political frictions caused by the application
of the countervailing duty laws.
Nevertheless, Commerce's present policy of holding benefits that
are provided on a non-discriminatory basis to all industries within a
specific region potentially countervailable is incorrect. Generally,
such benefits only affect the location of industries, not the patterns of
production, and therefore, they do not affect the patterns of trade. As
in the case of benefits which accrue to many industries, these region-
ally specific benefits should also be non-countervailable. It seems that
no amendment of the statute would be necessary to enable Commerce
to determine that these benefits are not countervailable because they
do not benefit specific sectors of an economy.
Although benefits that accrue to a wide range of industries should
not be countervailable, the fact that a benefit is conferred upon a spe-
cific industry does not per se mean that countervailing duties should be
imposed if the subsidized imports cause injury to U.S. producers of a
like product. One cannot always rely on the ITC's injury determina-
tion to prevent imposition of countervailing duties upon those sector-
and/or region-specific subsidies that are efficient or do not affect inter-
national trade. This is especially important where an investigation in-
volves both harmful and harmless subsidies and Commerce has to
aggregate the amounts of the respective benefits. Since Commerce
does not have the time, resources, and information to perform the de-
tailed economic analyses to show the efficiency or trade effects of each
particular subsidy, the burden of proof should be placed on the au-
thority that grants the subsidy. Present U.S. countervailing duty law
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does not contain sufficient possibilities to rebut this presumption of
inefficiency and distortive effects of subsidies. These grounds should
therefore be expanded. If the government of an exporting country is
able to prove that a particular benefit is efficient or does not affect
international trade, Commerce should be able to deduct the amount of




SPECIFICITY GUIDELINES FROM GATT COMMITTEE OF SUBSIDIES
AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES.' 59
I
It is recognized that the Agreement on Interpretation and Applica-
tion of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade intended that only certain government financial
assistance measures - those measures which are granted "with the
aim of giving advantage to certain enterprises" and which "are nor-
mally granted either regionally or by sector" (Article 11) - were to be
considered subsidies.
II
In seeking to determine whether government financial assistance
measures (hereinafter referred to as a measure) are specific to an enter-
prise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (hereinafter re-
ferred to as certain enterprises) and as such grant an advantage to
those enterprises or industries over those available to other enterprises
or industries the following considerations shall be taken into account:
(a) A measure may be specific to certain enterprises to the extent that
restrictions on access are placed by the granting authority;
(b) In determining whether any restrictions on access to a measure exist,
only those restrictions which affect access within the jurisdiction of the
granting authority are to taken into account;
(c) Where the granting authority explicitly limits access to a measure to
certain enterprises, such a measure would be specific;
(d) Where the granting authority acts to exclude certain enterprises
from access to a measure, specificity may or may not exist;
(e) Where the granting authority establishes certain criteria or condi-
tions for eligibility, no specificity would normally exist to the extent that
the criteria or conditions for eligibility were based on neutral factors' 60
and eligibility was automatic once the criteria or conditions were met;
(f) Evidence based in the above may not in certain cases give sufficient
guidance for a finding of non-specificity. It may be necessary in those
cases for the investigating authority to look beyond any nominal non-
specificity of a measure to determine whether the measure is, nonethe-
less, de facto deliberately granting an advantage to certain enterprises.
Any determination of specificity must be clearly substantiated;' 6'
159. SCM/W/89, reprinted in Inside U.S. Trade, April 8, 1988.
160. Neutral factors would normally be economic in nature, and horizontal in application
(i.e. not restricted to certain enterprises or industries); examples would be levels of unemploy-
ment, average per capita income, number of employees, amount of equity or revenues, but could
also include such factors as incidence of pollution or health and safety standards.
161. It remains for the signatories to address the issue of regional specificity.
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(g) Where neutral criteria are used by governments to determine access
to a measure, they must be clearly spelled out in law or regulation and be
capable of verification. In this regard, the granting authority should en-
sure that assistance is granted on the basis of the criteria established.
III
In calculating the amount of the subsidy determined to exist in
cases where the different potential subsidy programmes under consid-
eration involve different levels of granting authority (e.g., national, re-
gional, local), only measures found to be specific within the
jurisdiction of the granting authority for that measure shall be
considered.
